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Plaintiffs and Respondents,
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-vs.CARBIDE NUCLEAR

COM-

Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff

-vs.LESLIE A. TOMLINSON, Individually
and as Administrator of the Estate of A.
L. Tomlinson, Deceased,
Third-Party Defenoont and Appellant.

BRIEF OF THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT AND
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Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District,
in and for the County of Carbon, State of Utah
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KELLER, Judge
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Attorney for Third-Party Defendant
and Appellant
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Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff

-vs.LESLIE A. TOMLINSON, Individually
and as Administrator of the Estate of A.
L. Tomlinson, Deceased,
Third-Party Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT AND
APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appeal herein arises out of a prior action entitled
Acott, et al., vs. Tomlinson, 9 Utah 2d 71, 337 P.2d 720,
which case will hereinafter be referred to as the prior
case. The plaintiffs and respondents herein are indentiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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cal to the plaintiffs in the prior case, and the third-party
defendant and appellant herein was the defendant in the
prior case. The parties referred to constitute all of the
heirs of A.L. Tomlinson, deceased, except the widow
who was not a party to the prior case and is not a party
to this action. For convenience, plaintiffs and respondents will hereafter be referred to as Respondents and
third-party defendant will hereafter be referred to as
A.ppellant.
The fundamental matter involved in this case is the
interest of the Appellant in certain mining claims situate
in Emery County, which were the subject matter of the
prior case. This interest will be referred to herein as the
Tomlinson interest. The judgment in the prior case imposed a constructive trust in favor of the Respondents
as to 12/21st of the Tomlinson interest. It also awarded
Respondents a substantial money judgment by reason
of an accounting relating to the trust property. The proceedings following the judgment in the prior case, which
was entered on February 20, 1958, gave rise to the instant
case.
On the 1st day of April, 1958, the Respondents caused
an execution to issue out of the District Court of Carbon
County to subject the Appellant's rights in the Tomlinson interest to the judgment of February 20, 1958, (R. 2).
The Appellant moved the court to stay the sale and execution, but sofar as the record shows, the motion was
ignored. On May 8, 1958, the sheriff of Emery County
1nade and filed his return on execution, which represented
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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that the Appellant's interest had been sold to Respondents for the sum of $3,000.00, all of which, with the exception of $40.03, was applied to the judgment. The
Hheriff's deed, which was executed pursuant to the sale,
recited that the Respondents were the owners of the entire Tomlinson interest. This is the representation in
paragraph (c) of Respondents' motion for summary
judgment, (R. 33). On April 21, 1958, the Appellant
filed his notice of appeal in the prior case, (Appeal No.
8879). In that appeal, the Respondents filed a crossappeal claiming that the parties and the widow, Lillie M.
Tomlinson, had agreed to divide the estate of A. L. Tomlinson equally, each heir being entitled to a 1/8th interest.
The decision of this Court in the appeal was filed on
April 6, 1959. It affirmed the judgment of the trial court
as far as the constructive trust was concerned, but denied Respondents' claim relating to the division of interest. The language of the court is as follows:
"Notwithstanding plaintiffs' evidence that
the heirs, including the mother, when they shared
in the proceeds did so in equal shares, the evidence
is not so clear and persuasive as to make mandatory a finding that such was the agreement between them. Furthermore, the mother is not a
party to this suit. The effect of the plaintiffs'
contention is that the court should adjudicate her
rights, depriving her of her full widow's statutory
share in the property, in a suit to which she is not
a party, which the trial court properly refused
to do." Acott, et al., v. Tomlinson, supra.
During the process of the litigation of the prior case,
certain royalties had accumulated in the hands of certain
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trustees and Union Carbide Nuclear Company, defendant and third-party plaintiff herein. As a result of the
attempts to force the payment of the funds, the Respondents filed their complaint in this action on April1, 1958,
the date on which the writ of execution herein issued.
Upon the motion of Union Carbide Nuclear Company,
the Appellant was joined. Appellant filed his answer to
the third-party complaint and set forth a counterclaim,
and the Respondents thereafter filed their reply to the
counterclaim. On the 18th day of August, 1958, the
Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment,
(R. 36). The Respondents' motion came on for hearing
on the 19th day of August, 1958, at which time the court
denied the motion without prejudice to Respondents'
right to renew, (R. 62). The motion was renewed, and
was again heard on October 7, 1958, at which time the
court granted the motion and entered a judgment. (R.
43, 62). The Appellant thereafter filed his motion to
vacate judgment on the 23rd day of June, 1959, and the
court signed an amended judgment on the 7th of July,
1959, (R. 49).
The foregoing presents the events leading up to this
appeal with reference to the pleadings involved, and particularly the motion for summary judgment, the granting of which is the subject matter of this appeal.
STATEMENT OF POIKTS
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING RESPONDENTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ARGUMENT
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING RESPONDENTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

The Appellant believes that the proper purpose and
function of a motion for summary judgment is to separate the formal from the substantial issues, eliminate improper issues, determine the issues of fact which must be
presented to the court or jury and enable the court to give
judgment on the issues of law where no disputed issues of
fact are found. In arriving at the appropriate answer,
this Court has followed the rule that the party against
whom the judgment has been granted is entitled to have
all of the facts presented and the inferences arising therefrom considered in the light most favorable to him, Young
'V. The Texas Company, 8 Utah 2d 206, 331 P.2d 1099.
Accordingly, the party asking the court to grant a motion
for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating
clearly that there is no genuine issue of fact. 3 Federal
Practice and Procedure, section 1235. Where the motion
attempts to adjudicate the entire controversy, it should
be directed toward all of the pleadings.
It is difficult to determine whether Respondents'
motion was directed only to issues between them and defendant and third-party plaintiff, or was to include Appellant's answer and counterclaim. The appellant's answer and counterclaim raised issues of fact relating to
the sale on execution and the adequacy of the price
paid by the Respondents, who were the sole bidders and
purchasers. The record does not disclose that any menSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tion was made of the presence or absence of these issues.
Inspite of the fact that Respondents admitted there were
issues of fact, (T2, 5 line 7) the court apparently adjudicated the entire controversy. There was no presentation
of facts to the court, and the court apparently accepted
the representations of Respondents in their motion for
summary judgment as sufficient to satisfy the burden
of proof. There is nothing else to establish the presence
or absence of issues of facts or indicate a showing by
Respondents, let alone meeting the burden of proof. Appellant believes that he is entitled to be heard as to all
issues, fact or law. He is entitled to ask a court of equity
to inquire into the execution sale and consider whether,
in the light of all of the facts, the court should intervene
because of inadequate consideration and whether theRespondents had a right to purchase and whether or not the
sale was attended by circumstances of unfairness. This
Court has so held in Pender v. Dowse, 265 P.2d 644, 1
Utah 2d 283 at page 288:
"It is well settled that equity will intervene
and set aside an execution sale or cancel a sheriff's deed, after the redemption period has expired, where it appears the consideration was
grossly inadequate and the sale was attended by
unfairness and fraud."
While a motion for summary judgment has the purpose of expediting litigation and therefore serves a useful
and proper purpose, it was not intended to dispense with
every facet of legal proceedings. Respondents' motion
for summary judgment was not directed to the AppelSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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lant. The complaint herein prayed for relief against
LTnion Carbide Nuclear Company, and the motion for
summary judgment asked that the Respondents have
judgment against that party alone and did not purport to
determine any issues raised by Appellant's counterclaim.
It avoids the questions raised by Appellant, and seeks
a determination sufficient to compel the defendant Union
Carbide Nuclear Company to pay over money it holds.
After this is accomplished, Appellant's rights will certainly go begging, without regard to their merit. Without
inquiry, an amended judgment was entered decreeing
that the Appellant had no rights whatsoever in the Tomlinson interest, (R. 49). In the first judgment, (R. 43)
the Respondents led the court into error by urging it to
decree that Respondents were the owners of the entire
Tomlinson interest, contrary to the trial courts own
judgment and the decision of this Court. The amended
judgment (R. 48) accomplishes the same result. In their
motions for summary judgment, (R. 33, 36) the Respondents represent that they are entitled to a judgment
'' (c) declaring plaintiffs to be entitled to receive the entire 3.7158 per cent of the royalties due or becoming due
under said lease from l\fay 1, 1958, when plaintiffs became the purchasers of Third Party Defendant's interest
in said claims at a Sheriff's Sale pursuant to a writ of
Execution of Civil No. 7468, a copy of the Certificate
of Sale being attached to the Answer to Third Party
Complaint in this action;". If anyone looked at the record
to determine the title to the property involved, the judgment in the prior case, the sheriff's deed and the amended
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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judgment would place the ownership of the entire Tomlinson interest in the Respondents, just as they claimed.
While the trial court intended to correct this, the amended
judgment fails in the attempt.
Appellant by his answer and counterclaim has
urged that the deed was wholly void. Appellant contends that he has an interest that the deed extinguishes;
and therefore, he has a right to attack its validity. This
presents additional issues of fact which Appellant believes genuine. The recital in the judgment that there
is no genuine issue of any material fact is based solely
on the affidavit of Thomas C. Cuthbert, one of theRespondents' attorneys. That affidavit merely stated that
upon information he believes that the defendant Union
Carbide Nuclear Company was holding $738.64, of which
Respondents were entitled to $422.08. Not only does this
affidavit fail to dispel the notion that there are no genuine issues of fact, it is insufficient as an affidavit as to
the matters it does set forth:
"It has been held that since affidavits must
be made upon personal knowledge, an attorney's
affidavit is usually insufficient, unless he has personal knowledge of the facts." 3 Federal Practice
and Procedure, section 1237 at page 166.
"Where attorney's affidavit, in support of
motion or summary judgment \Yas made upon
information and belief and relevant portion thereof did not comply wj th Rule 56 (e), r nited States
Supreme ·Court would disregard avern1ent in the
motion as not supported by record. Automatic
Radio Mfg. Co. Y. Hazeltine Research, :l\fass. 1950.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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70 S. Ct. 894, 339 U.S. 827, 94 L. Ed. 1312." 3
Federal PractiJce and Procedure, section 1237 at
page 166, note 47.
The court realized that issues were involved which
should be presented on a trial. The court at the hearing
on the motion stated:
"THE COURT: What I am concerned about
is whether the record is such that I could grant a
summary judgment. That is the whole story. It is
not supported by any affidavit.

* * *
THE COURT: Well, I have some doubts
about this but I'll let you take your summary
judgment on that basis. But I may be making
an error on that. Why don't you have the case
come on for trial and settle all these things?"
(T2. 4,5).
The above statement of the court was made at the
tin1e the first judgment was entered, but at the hearing
on Appellant's motion to vacate, nothing more was said
about issues of fact. It merely went to the proposition
that the court had been led to grant more than it intended, (Tl. 3, lines 8-22). It is evident from the transcript
that the court intended that the Respondents should only
have judgment for a portion of the monies held by the
defendant Union Carbide Nuclear Company. The transcript clearly indicates this to be the case:
"THE COURT: Then all you want is a judgment for four hundred twenty-two dollars and
some odd cents and any other sums that have
become due. You want that sort of a thing on
your summary judgment~
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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MR. LOWE: I'd like that." (T2. 4,5).
Upon the hearing of Appellant's motion to vacate
judgment, it was clear that the court intended Appellant
to have an opportunity to be heard before an amended
judgment was signed. The court realized that the method
of presenting the amended judgment was a short cut
because it was not consistent with the Respondents'
motion for summary judgment, and the court admitted
that the matter was not properly before him, (Tl. 4, line
22). Respondents' counsel mailed the proposed amended
judgment to the court under date of July 3, 1959. A copy
was not served on Appellant or any other party. The
court apparenty waited three or four days and then
signed the judgment thinking no objections were to be
made by Appellant's counsel. This is indicated by the
following statement by the court:
"THE COURT: All right, you prepare it, file
it, and I will entertain a motion to strike it if you
have any question about it, and that is the way
we will do that." (Tl. 4).
The judgment having been signed, it appeared that a
motion to strike would be untimely, and Appellant's only
relief was an appeal. The notion that there are genuine
issues to be tried by the court is evident from other partf:
of the record. Appellate courts in determining a motion
for summary judgment have taken the view that they are
entitled to look at all matters in the record to determine
the propriety of the granting or denying a motion for
summary judgment.
"On such a n1otion the rourt ronsiders the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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entire setting of the case and all papers of record.
The pleadings as a whole, and not merely the
complaint, are considered." 3 Federal Practice
and Procedttre, section 1236 at page 158.
~ubsequent

to this appeal, other parties have moved

to vacate the judg1nent on the ground that the interests

not yet deternrined. These are: Motion to Modify
dl" Vacate Judgment by defendant Union Carbide Nuclear
Company (R. ;)±); Motion to Modify Judgment (R. 55);
:md :\Iotion to Vacate Garnishee Judgment (R. 56).

,trt'

Lt appears to be apparent from the record in this
·a~e that there was no adequate basis for the granting
()f the 1notion.
.Jfany issues are still pending and have
arisen subsequent to the appeal herein. Appellant relluests that this case be reversed and remanded to the
trial court for further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted,
FRED H. EVANS
Attorney for Third-Party Defendant
and Appellant
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